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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the interrelation of reputation with corporate
performance in a crisis and consider the factors that make up the balance between strong recovery,
bare survival and failure. The emphasis is on corporate communication and corporate governance.
Design/methodology/approach – The current debate on reputation and the validity of the term
reputation management is reviewed and cases studies from Australia and the UK are examined.
Findings – The paper finds that, in the case studies, poor management, unethical practices, a lack of
engagement with customers and other stakeholders, indifferent or aggressive performances by CEOs
and lack of preparedness for crisis communication severely or terminally affected the organisations. It
identifies a new reputational factor of predictability and considers why some organisations survive a
crisis that has strong negative ethical dimensions while others fail.
Originality/value – This paper scrutinises existing concepts of reputation and reputation
management and finds that they are not able to predict recovery, survival or failure of
organisations. A new definition of reputation is put forward and the factor of predictability is
emphasised in proposals for new applied theory.
Keywords Ethics, Behaviour, Business performance, Australia, United Kingdom
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Reputation is of immense importance to all organisations, whether they are
commercial, governmental, or not-for-profit. To achieve goals, remain competitive, and
prosper, the received wisdom is that good reputation paves the organisational path to
acceptance and approval by stakeholders. It also underpins competitive advantage by
demonstrating distinctive differences from other similar organisations. The benefits of
a positive corporate reputation are an intangible asset contributing most to overall
corporate success (Hall, 1992), that supports premium pricing and product quality
(Klein and Leffler, 1981), aids staff recruitment (Stigler, 1962), improves access to
financial resources (Beatty and Ritter, 1986) and attracts investors (Milgrom and
Roberts, 1986) and inhibits the mobility of rivals (Caves and Porter, 1977; Dowling,
1994).
Argenti and Druckenmiller argue that, “organisations increasingly recognize the
importance of corporate reputation to achieve business goals and stay competitive”
(Argenti and Druckenmiller, 2004, p. 368). While there are many recent examples of
organisations where poor leadership and unethical business practice behaviour have
destroyed their reputation, such as Enron, Arthur Andersen and WorldCom, the
positive case for reputation is that it fosters the continued expansion of excellent
companies such as Johnson & Johnson and Philips and innovators such as Cisco
Systems, which appear regularly in the top percentile of rankings of the most respected
organisations in the USA and Europe (Gardberg and Fombrun, 2002).
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/1363-254X.htm
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In an eight-country study, Kitchen and Laurence (2003) explored corporate
reputation management practice. Reputation was found to be of the greatest
importance in achieving corporate objectives, with the highest ranking in the
anglophone world. A theme of this study was the weight given to the CEO’s reputation
in determining corporate reputation. Amongst their conclusions were that corporate
reputation is increasing in importance; key influencers on reputation are customers,
employees and the CEO; corporate reputation and CEO reputation are increasingly
intertwined; and the CEO is inevitably cast in the role of chief communicator.
What is evident is that reputation does not occur by chance. It relates to leadership,
management, and organisational operations, the quality of products and services, and -
crucially - relationships with stakeholders. It is also connected to communication
activities and feedback mechanisms.
This paper explores reputation and reputation management. A new definition of
organisational reputation is proposed which is tested in case studies of reputation
using recent examples from Australia and the UK.
Notions of reputation
In the corporate world, reputation is seen as a major element of an organisation’s
provenance alongside and included in financial performance and innovation. It is
socially complex and intangible, highly specific to each organisation and part of a
process of “social legitimization” of the organisation (Martin de Castro et al., 2006).
There is also an historical aspect (Hall, 1992; Yoon et al., 1993). It is perceptual
(Fombrun, 1996; Wartick, 2002), emotive (Groenland, 2002) and comprises affective
and cognitive dimensions (Llewellyn, 2002; Schwaiger, 2004). Dowling (1994, p. 8)
defines corporate reputation as “. . .the evaluation (respect, esteem, estimation) in
which an organisation’s image is held by people”. Argenti and Druckenmiller (2004,
p. 369) refer to it as “The collective representation of multiple constituencies’ images of
a company built up over time and based on a company’s identity programs, its
performance and how constituencies have perceived its behaviour”. Fombrun and
Rindova (2005) say that it is a collective representation of an organisation’s past
behaviour and outcomes that depict its ability to render results to stakeholders in the
future. This is also reflected in Coombs’ scholarship on crisis communication
(Situational Crisis Communication Theory) which argues that past crises form a
reputational threat to organisation in varying levels of intensity (Coombs, 2004).
Llewellyn (2002, p. 447) expands definitions to include affective and cognitive elements:
“Reputation occurs as stakeholders evaluate their knowledge of or encounters with an
organisation [cognitive] vis-a`-vis their expectations, which are couched within their
individual values (personal identities) or collective norms [affective]”.
The definitions of Dowling, Argenti and Druckenmiller and of Fombrun and
Rindova are that reputation is a “collective representation” of images and perceptions,
not merely a self-promotional message. It involves relationships with all stakeholders
(“constituencies”) and is gained, maintained, and enhanced or detracted from over time.
For greater understanding of reputation, these primarily organisational management
approaches can be improved with the inclusion of emotional (affective/cognitive)
elements, as proposed by Llewellyn (2002) and Schwaiger (2004), which separate the
perception of the stakeholder from their behaviour. Two case studies – Ansett Airlines
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and Rover – discussed later demonstrate the separation of these factors and the
outcomes when they occlude negatively.
A factor that has not appeared prominently in public relations and communications
literature is “predictability”. In political science and political economy, it is the key
factor. “The fundamental appeal and importance of this concept [reputation] for
economists, and political scientists influenced by their writing, is that reputation lets
actors predict others’ moves during strategic interaction, according to the ‘extrapolation
principle’” (Sharman, 2007, p. 20). This principle is “the phenomenon that people
extrapolate the behaviour of others from past observations and this extrapolation is
self-stabilising because it provides an incentive to live up to these expectations. . .By
observing others’ behaviour in the past, one can fairly confidently predict their
behaviour in the future without incurring further costs” (Von Weizsacker, 1980, p. 72).
Fombrun and Van Riel (2004) touch on predictability with a reference that
reputation involves stakeholder judgements “about a company’s ability to fulfil their
expectations” but most definitions and descriptions consider that reputation is a
collection of images and behaviours (see Argenti and Druckenmiller, 2004, Dowling,
1994). In public relations, the extrapolation principle has not been explored widely and
the case studies that follow will consider its impact in the form of “predictability”.
While the historical aspect of reputation and the ability to deliver future results is
noted (Fombrun and Rindova, 2005), it is not explicated as ‘predictability’. Coombs
(2004, p. 287) refers to crisis history and crisis type as the basis for planning the
communication response, “by accounting for the effects of crisis history, crisis
managers can craft messages that more effectively protect the organization’s
reputational assets” but this relevant advice is aimed at communicators and not the
responses of stakeholders and so also falls short of “predictability”.
Bringing this discussion together, a new definition of organisational (or corporate)
reputation is proposed as: “The sum of predictable behaviours, relationships and
two-way communication undertaken by an organisation as judged affectively and
cognitively by its stakeholders over a period of time.” It will be explored in the case
studies and subsequent discussion leading to proposals for new applied theory.
Reputation’s value in a crisis
Fombrun and Van Riel (2004) posit that the value of a corporate reputation is
magnified in a crisis because of the loss of physical assets and business momentum,
the impact on people assets and the expected clear-up and associated legal costs
associated. “Over time, some companies recover dissipated value quickly and the crisis
fizzles. Others experience more extended damage. Research suggests that the enduring
difference may well lie in how the crisis is handled and what the reputation of the
company was beforehand.” (Fombrun and Van Riel, 2004, pp. 34-5).
Knights and Pretty (1999, pp. 368-9), studied the impact of major manmade crises on
fifteen large companies, ranging from Johnson & Johnson’s response to Tylenol
tampering to Heineken’s recall of bottled beer because of rumours of glass shards in its
bottles. On average, the stocks took an eight per cent loss in value. However, the
preparedness and speed of response categorised the companies into “recoverers” and
“non-recoverers”. The recoverers’ stock sagged only five per cent in the first few weeks,
while non-recoverers dropped an average eleven per cent. After ten weeks, the
recoverers rose an average of five per cent and stayed in “positive territory” for the
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balance of the year. The non-recoverers, by contrast, stayed down and finished the year
down by fifteen per cent. Overall, the reputational losses associated with crises are
substantial and, on average, amount to eight to fifteen per cent of the market values of
affected companies” (Fombrun and Van Riel, 2004, p. 38). This taxonomy is reviewed
in following research questions, case studies and subsequent discussion (see Table I).
Research questions and testing
From the literature review and discussion, three questions are explored. These are:
RQ1. What is the influence of reputational asset in adverse commercial conditions,
especially where ethical behaviour may be weak?
RQ2. What is the importance of factors such as predictability and of the balance
between affective and cognitive attitudes in determining an organisation’s
progress after a crisis or other adverse conditions?
RQ3. Why do some companies fail to overcome crises and others survive? This also
tests the Knights and Pretty (1999) taxonomy of “recoverers” and
“non-recoverers”.
Three case studies have been chosen from Australia and one from the United Kingdom.
As they come from similar business/regulatory environments, there is commonality in
the cultural, legislative and media scrutiny environment which reduces these factors as
variables. All occurred in the past six years and so offer contemporary comparisons.
The four case studies include a national airline (failure), a building materials
manufacturer (survivor), a grain exporter (survivor) and a mass market vehicle
manufacturer (failure). They have been chosen for the national impact of their
behaviours and subsequent plight, and their prominence in media coverage and the
similar outcomes of unethical behaviour.
Case studies
These case studies show reputation and corporate communication under the closest
examination of continuing stress and crisis situations. They appear alphabetically and
are categorised as Failure or Survival.
Ansett Airlines: reputation loss leads to collapse – failure
After operating since 1937, the long-established Australian airline Ansett collapsed in
2001 after a series of aircraft maintenance crises eroded public confidence. It was the
Recoverers Initial loss of stock value of five per cent
By 50th day after incident, stock has risen by five per cent over
pre-incident stock value
Non-recoverers Initial loss of stock value of 11 per cent
Unchanged stock value for fifth to 50th day; Cumulative negative
stock value of almost 15 per cent, up to a year after incident
Source: Knights and Pretty (1999, pp. 368-9)
Table I.
Taxonomy – recoverers
and non-recoverers
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long-term beneficiary of its government’s “two airlines” policy which sought to ensure
competition. The first crisis came at Christmas 2000 when six of its largest Boeing 767
aircraft were grounded for urgent safety inspections and missed maintenance leaving
more than 20,000 people stranded. This was followed at Easter 2001 by a further
grounding of the same aircraft to inspect engine mounts for cracks. Four aircraft were
found to have the cracks and were taken out of service. In addition, it was found that
Ansett had known of the problem with engine mounts for 12 months and had failed to
act (Sydney Morning Herald, 2001). Even worse followed when the national air safety
regulator grounded all ten Boeing 767s after finding that “one aircraft had flown for
more than a day with none of its emergency slides in the operating position” (Easdown
and Wilms, 2002, p. 19).
After the Easter crisis, travellers’ intentions to rebook for travel by Ansett had fallen
to 25 per cent. In response to this, the airline’s communication strategy was to place its
chief executive before the media in order to apologise to customers and assure them of
improvements in the quality of service. Travellers’ “intentions” [affective view] rose to
58 per cent and Ansett followed this with a $A20 million advertising campaign, entitled
“Absolutely” using the chief executive and high-profile sports and entertainment stars
(Easdown and Wilms, 2002, p. 20) but this campaign had a boomerang effect on
customers. Facing insolvency, Ansett shut down its operations on 15 September 2001.
McDonald (2006) has applied attribution theory to Ansett’s problems and using
qualitative research found the dominant customer attitude to the airline had been anger
directed at it and distrust in the senior executive staff to manage effectively and tell the
truth. Because of the maintenance problems which had seen the airline grounded by
the government air safety watchdog, passengers and potential passengers had largely
perceived the airline as responsible for its own fate. In effect, the passengers’ views had
a negative affective/cognitive alignment. McDonald also found that the “Absolutely”
advertising campaign had a negative effect with one interviewee commenting that the
$20 million would have been better spent on aircraft maintenance.
Additionally, when crisis messages, such as that delivered by the Ansett CEO, were perceived
as lies, anger resulted and negative character attributions were made about company
management. Such dispositional attributions revealed strong negative attitudes to those
companies caught lying and contribute to the public’s lack of trust in the integrity of
organisations (McDonald, 2006, p. 10).
Ansett ultimately failed because its accumulated debts and decline in passenger
numbers left it insolvent, but, as McDonald (2006) has found, there was profound
distrust in all aspects of its communications and performance. As a result the
government did not intervene to protect the two-airline competition policy because the
airline’s behaviour was no politically defendable, with a key reason being that the
Ansett’s behaviour was no longer predictable. Even the CEO’s decision to take the lead
on communication with customers through media relations and advertising, often seen
as best practice in the management of reputation, was a failure because it reinforced
the image of an airline that did not care for the safety of its customers and crews but
put its effort into image development.
AWB International: reputation damaged by unethical behaviour – survival
Australia has been a major export of agricultural produce since the mid-nineteenth
century. Wheat has always ranked highly in importance in volume and value
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providing incomes to many thousands of farmers across the nation. There has long
been a market for the crop in the Middle East, notably in Iraq, and this continued after
the first Gulf War when the United Nations introduced the Oil-for-Food program. For
Australia’s sole licenced wheat exporter AWB International (the privatised Australian
Wheat Board), the Iraqi market provided sales of 10 million tonnes of wheat for more
than a decade. This was notionally supplied at market price through a United
Nations-approved process.
The Volcker report into the Oil-for-Food program, however, found there was “a sink
of corruption” (The Australian, 2005) and that AWB was one of traders with Iraq
which engaged in practices that inflated the price of imports and provided income to
the Sadaam Hussein regime. The revelation by the Volcker report led to the
appointment by the Federal Government of a Commission to enquire into the
behaviour of AWB. This enquiry was known as the Cole Commission after its
commissioner. Although AWB management had publicly denied any wrong-doing, a
succession of witnesses from within AWB or close to it reported that the deceit to
disguise kickbacks from the UN was well-planned and persistently undertaken.
Because of its behaviour, AWB’s legislatively enshrined status as the sole licenced
seller of Australian wheat on world markets – known as the “single desk” – came
under threat.
The Cole Commission report was released on November 27, 2006. It recommended
that 11 former AWB executives and an oil businessman face possible criminal charges
for allegedly deceiving the United Nations and Australian government over the
scandal. Subsequently, the Government has taken the “single desk” away and handed
it to a grower group from 2008 onwards, with an important judgement being that
AWB’s ethical behaviour was no longer defendable or predictable. AWB has also
produced poor financial performance (a 71 per cent fall in half year after tax profits to
end of March 2007) (ABC Radio National, 2007) and the loss of its business reputation
(a continuing decline in share price). Because it has national commercial interests in
Australia which are separate from international trading, AWB is likely to survive as a
business but it has almost certainly lost its international reputation and its freedom of
operation.
James Hardie Industries: deceptive behaviour damages competitive freedom – survival
From the early twentieth century onward, asbestos was mined in Australia and
processed into building materials, principally for internal and external wallboards.
Houses built with the external materials were given the generic nickname of “fibro
houses” after the fibrous asbestos source minerals and there are hundreds of thousands
of these humble abodes across the country. In the latter part of the 20th century, it
became apparent that many thousands of miners and building workers were suffering
from the lung diseases mesothelioma and asbestosis caused by exposure to asbestos
fibres. One of the major producers of these asbestos products (from 1917 to 1987) is
James Hardie Industries which was faced with increasingly large compensation
demands.
In a defensive move, the company moved its ownership offshore in 2001 to Holland
and at the same time created a body called the Medical Research and Compensation
Foundation which took over the rump of its Australian interests and was to handle
compensation claims. At the time of the corporate split, the Hardie issued a news
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release which stated that the $A293 million it had made available to the Foundation
“was sufficient to meet all legitimate compensation claims anticipated from people
injured by asbestos products manufactured in the past . . . ” (New South Wales
Government, 2004, pp. 354-5). It also indicated that the move to Holland was to
facilitate its international expansion. Actuarial assessments, however, estimated the
liability over the next 40 years at $A1.5 billion (Sydney Morning Herald, 2004a),
although this was recently reduced to $A1.35 billion for a projected 12,739 claims
(SMH.com, 2007).
In 2004, the state government in New South Wales convened a Special Committee of
enquiry into the Medical Research and Compensation Foundation whose aim was to
investigate the company’s conduct. It found the Foundation did not have sufficient
funds to meet all anticipated legitimate compensation claims and was massively
underfunded; and that Hardie’s statement that returns from the Foundation’s
investments would cover future liabilities was “fanciful” (New South Wales
Government, 2004, p. 358). Commissioner Jackson, who led the enquiry, found that
senior management were deliberately dishonest and “prepared to be deceitful” about
the extent of asbestos claims. He also found that two senior executives were not
credible witnesses (Sydney Morning Herald, 2004b). One of his determinations was that
the corporate communications activity in 2001 had been deliberately misleading
(Howell et al., 2005, p. 5) and had been planned as such. These activities were
undertaken to support Hardie’s reputation in the international building materials
market and Jackson said that “public relations played a larger than healthy part in the
activities of the James Hardie Group” (New South Wales Government, 2004, pp. 358-9).
The outcomes of this period of organisational behaviour and its investigations were
that a new chairman was appointed and after a considerable delay the main executives
criticised by Commissioner Jackson left the company. In the meantime, several states
proposed legislation specifically targeted at Hardie including its removal from all
tender lists; while the national trade union movement ran an angry campaign against
it. Hardie recently agreed to extend its compensation package and to reduce legal
restrictions applied to claimants.
James Hardie has not failed, nor has it lost its place in the world-wide market for
building products but it has lost the trust of many as an ethical and responsible
business. Although the Australia-wide union campaign has ended, contractors are
reluctant to order Hardie products, a doubt that will take many years to eradicate. The
company’s share price has remained solid, although it consistently trails below the
benchmark ASX200. In its latest annual report, Hardie reported a rise in profits in 2006,
after a massive loss in 2005 when it had made a provision of $716 million for
asbestos-related claims (SMH.com, 2007). The improved performance, however, has
come from the United States which it could be argued is outside the reputational
envelope of the disease-related behaviour. But for purposes of this paper, Hardie’s
attempt to manage reputation in 2001 signally failed because of the deceptive
behaviour of senior executives and the failure of the organisation to correct them
quickly. Subsequently, its ability to operate freely has been severely limited by vastly
increased government oversight, union antipathy and increased costs for
compensation and legal services. It can also be argued that the degraded
reputational situation had engendered a loss of predictability in relationships with
many key stakeholders, including government which has instituted the major enquiry.
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Rover – vehicle manufacturer (failure)
The case of Rover (and its antecedents) can be accurately described as a saga because
of the longevity of its problems. From the early 1970s, large-scale vehicle production in
the United Kingdom was in doubt because of competition from non-UK manufacturers
and a range of factors that made profitable production problematic (quality, industrial
issues, marketing). By the early 1990s, the Rover group (formerly British Leyland and
BL) was again foundering. Its then owner British Aerospace sold the business to the
German BMW car business. By the late 1990s, BMW which had invested heavily in
Rover was losing £2,000 on every car that was made and sold. Within BMW, Rover
became known as “the English Patient”, an allusion to the film of the same name,
because of its continually sickly condition (Brady and Lorenz, 2005, p. 108).
This brief case study will not chronicle the decline and fall of Rover, which is well
documented elsewhere, but review the impact of reputation and corporate behaviour at
two crucial points. In 2000, when BMW’s exasperation with Rover’s performance was
reaching a terminal stage, as its market share had slumped to 4.6 per cent and well
below the 11.3 per cent when the company was acquired, it undertook “what amounted
to a disinformation programme throughout the first quarter . . . ” (Brady and Lorenz,
2005, p. 165) and told staff and car dealers that it was proceeding with a reorganisation
and had no intentions of selling Rover. It also made assuring comments to the Industry
Secretary Stephen Byers and sought his support for an EU aid package worth £152
million. In the meantime, BMW was actively touting Rover to competitors and in
negotiations with the private equity firm Alchemy to break up the business. When the
news of the potential sale to Alchemy broke in March 2000, Rover’s reputation
amongst all stakeholders sank to a new low. One newspaper headline, “It’s all over
Rover” (Brady and Lorenz, 2005, p. 171), summed up the sentiment. BMW did not
complete the deal with Alchemy and sold the business for a notional £10 to a group of
former Rover managers called Phoenix Holdings. In effect, BMW had destroyed what
was left of Rover’s reputation with British stakeholders by its action in the
“disinformation” activity in the first half of 2000.
Phoenix’s ownership of Rover was disastrous and the car maker shut down in 2005.
The expected benefit of a return to British ownership stimulating national sales did not
eventuate. It can be surmised that while British buyers were sympathetic to Rover (the
affective element), they had known about the problems of the marque and its products
for 30 years (the cognitive element) and because of the long-term decline in both
product and corporate reputation chose not to purchase them. In the Phoenix period,
the new management was unsuccessful in turning the business around or engaging the
support of key stakeholders, especially the Government which had long ceased to be
supportive of Rover. Although there was a long history of political and financial
support for Rover, one of the factors in its demise was surely that its behaviour was
demonstrably no longer predictable or apparently ethical. In 2005, after being misled
by BMW and then Phoenix, it decided to not intervene again in the West Midlands
motor industry. That was the end of Rover, which had no beneficial reputation left.
Discussion
In all the case studies, poor management, unethical practices, a lack of engagement
with customers and other stakeholders, indifferent or aggressive performances by
CEOs and lack of preparedness for crisis communication severely or terminally
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affected these companies. They also failed the test of “predictability”. Using Knight
and Pretty’s “recoverers” or “non-recoverers” taxonomy, two have staged or will stage
weak recoveries (James Hardie and AWB) while the other two were terminal
“non-recoverers” (Ansett, and Rover), although BMW as owner of Rover for seven
years has bounced back as a strong “recoverer”.
RQ1. What is the influence of reputational asset in adverse commercial conditions,
especially where ethical performance is weak?
The reputation asset of James Hardie and AWB International, according to their share
prices and market sentiment, was high before the crises that engulfed them. Once the
exterior wrapping was taken off, both were seen to have weak ethical performances in
their operations and relationships with key stakeholders, notably governments. In
Hardie’s case, it was found to have practiced deception in its communication practices
and so had little strength with which to defend the company. This is also the condition
that Ansett and Rover found themselves in but their position was worse as both had been
in the public eye for problematic service performance for some years, although they
notionally had governmental sentiment on their side (respectively, two-airline policy
and support for the West Midlands motor industry). Both should have been in a position
to survive, if well managed and fully engaged with stakeholders. Both, however, had
communication and presentational problems and had failed to create “the historical
associations in the minds of publics through strategic communications” that lead to
“favourable ‘top of mind’ visibility” (Gardberg and Fombrun, 2002, p. 385). Rover’s path
to failure, in retrospect, could have been pre-destined because of the long-term problems
of the British motor industry, but with better management and communications, it could
have survived in a smaller, more efficient form. The behaviour of BMW, with its
“disinformation” in 2000 prior to selling the business and the Phoenix management’s
failure to engage with stakeholders, activated that destiny of failure and cost thousands
of jobs. Ansett, too, failed in its communication and behaviour to leverage the brand
name and its historical connection with commercial air transport in Australia to such an
extent that Government let it fail rather than support the two-airline policy. The
reputational asset of both was effectively non-existent when crises struck.
In summary, all four cases demonstrate that without clearly understood and
strongly developed reputational assets, organisations will struggle or fail in adverse
commercial conditions.
RQ2. What is the importance of factors such as predictability and of the balance
between affective and cognitive attitudes in determining an organisation’s
progress after a crisis or other adverse conditions?
These case studies, especially the two failures and AWB, demonstrate that
predictability is an important factor that has been little recognised. Because the
organisation’s behaviour became unreliable (Ansett), untrusted in communications
(Rover) and unethical (AWB), it was one of the main factors that caused major
stakeholders such as governments and regulators to withdraw their support as these
companies were no longer predictable. For Hardie, other stakeholders such as unions,
the media and state governments turned against it and have limited its commercial
freedom. The affective/cognitive balance applies to consumers and non-governmental
stakeholders more than governments and was evident in Ansett and Rover where the
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affective sympathy to both for historical reasons was out of alignment with the
cognitive experience of the services of the airline and the carmaker’s products. These
consumer stakeholders wanted both to continue in operation but chose not to purchase
their flights or cars.
In summary, predictability is a new and important factor in analysing and
explaining the reputation of organisations in relation to government and regulators,
while the affective/cognitive balance is more relevant to the consumer/community
interface. Both demonstrate that reputation cannot be interpreted as a single entity.
RQ3. Why do some companies fail to overcome crises and others survive? This also
tests the Knights and Pretty (1999) taxonomy of “recoverers” and
“non-recoverers”
To an extent, RQ1 and RQ2 have answered the question about failure and survival.
The factors that aid survival are ethical behaviour and good corporate governance,
two-way communication with internal and external stakeholders, and the ability to
build and maintain supportive relationships with these stakeholders. As to why AWB
and Hardie survive, although with problems, while Ansett and Rover failed, it is
primarily that they were financially stronger before the crises and, subsequently, have
been able to separate or “ring fence” their problem areas from other areas of the
businesses. Hardie, while besieged in Australia, has prospered in the United States.
AWB has Australian-based agribusinesses that have been little affected by the Iraq
payments scandal. Both, therefore, have cash flow and business identities that continue
little affected by the storm and fury over ethical behaviour. Ansett and Rover did not
have the opportunity to separate the problem areas from the successful ones because
there weren’t any.
In considering the Knights and Pretty taxonomy of recoverers and non-recoverers,
the case studies have shown that it is too limited in its scope and should have a third
category of “failures”. It is also suggested that “non-recoverers” be re-titled as
“survivors” (see Table II).
Proposals for applied theory
In conclusion, these proposals for applied theory are based on the preceding discussion
and the testing of definition proposed earlier in this paper that “reputation is the sum of
Recoverers As per Knights and Pretty (1999), after initial loss of
stock value (c. five per cent) the stock recovers
strongly. Continues operating with same freedom as
before the incident
Survivors (re-naming of non-recoverer) As per Knights and Pretty (1999), the company’
stock value falls initially by c. 11 per cent, and after a
year, remains lower (c. 15 per cent) and consistently
below market trends. Is vulnerable to take-over and
has limited operational scope
Failures Organisation suffers major loss in stock value and
market confidence. Is unable to remain as a separate
entity and/or collapses
Source: Knights and Pretty (1999, pp. 368-9), with modifications
Table II.
Revised taxonomy –
recoverers, survivors and
failures
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predictable behaviours, relationships and two-way communication undertaken by an
organisation as judged affectively and cognitively by its stakeholders over a period of
time”.
Reputation has affective and cognitive elements in its make-up. Having one element,
such as sympathy (affective) does not – in the cases of Ansett and Rover – sustain an
organisation’s existence if the cognitive (experience of the organisation) is not balanced
with it.
The loss of predictability in Ansett and Rover’s cases was one of several reasons
that led to withdrawal of government and political support because of the erosion or
elimination of their reputation. AWB’s ethical and operational performance has
resulted in the removal of its valued “single desk status” with predictability also one of
the factors because government could no longer support its operations on international
markets as being ethical and representative of the country’s normal business
behaviour.
James Hardie is a partial exception to the cognitive/affective and predictability
analyses. Its reputation and operations have suffered within Australia, as evidenced by
union boycotts and government regulations, but it has returned to profit from
operations in other countries where the asbestos disease issue has little impact. So any
claim to universality of these factors may be tempered by the physical situation of the
crisis/behaviour (despite the reach of the Internet).
Two proposals for new applied theory are made.
Proposition 1
Reputation is an asset in a crisis when it has these characteristics.
. Affective and cognitive elements are in an organisationally-beneficial alignment.
. The organisation operates in an historically predictable manner with a set of
ethical and organisational behaviours that are acceptable to governmental and
other key regulatory stakeholders.
. There is ethical leadership by the CEO and management (dominant coalition)
that is supported by two-way communication and engagement with
stakeholders.
. The ability to manage the immediate crisis is less important if the organisation
satisfies the characteristics of affective-cognitive alignment, predictability and
ethical leadership. Without these characteristics, crisis management is likely to
be unsuccessful in creating strong “recoverer” conditions and lead to a prolonged
struggle for survival.
Proposition 2
. The taxonomy of “recoverers” and “non-recoverers” proposed by Knights and
Pretty (1999) should be revised to: “recoverers”, “survivors” and “failures”.
. Failure is the most likely outcome for organisations with weak
cognitive/affective balance and predictability than survival, especially if they
are dependent on goodwill from government and regulators.
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Limitations and implications
Apart from the Ansett case study, which reviewed McDonald’s (2006) study of
attribution by stakeholders, the case studies have been based on published sources and
financial data. This limits their generalisability (Coombs, 2007) and future research
needs to investigate the cognitive and affective responses of actual or potential
stakeholders who are associated with crises caused by problematic ethical behaviour.
Future research using situational studies (Coombs and Holladay, 2006; Lyon and
Cameron, 2004) could test the propositions, notably that of affective-cognitive
alignment, for the consistency of their applicability. Coombs (2004) and Coombs and
Holladay (2006) have argued for variable impacts on reputation from different types of
crises and the prior history of an organisation in handling crises. Their approach has
largely been based on a monolithic structure of reputation. It would be relevant and
informative to test the propositions of this paper for a two-part (affective/cognitive)
reputation against their modeling of crisis communication that has largely been
developed to advise communication practitioners.
The implication of the proposals are that the consideration of reputation as a
determinant of post-crisis response and an influence on survival or failure of an
organisation should include consideration of two aspects of reputation and whether the
notion of reputation as a source of defensive “capital” (Alsop, 2004) is a false one.
Predictability of organisational behaviour, this paper has posited, offers defensive
value that is potentially greater than the immediate crisis response which is so often
the focus of public relations and organisational communication research. It is a factor
that has not been explored in detail and deserves greater consideration because of its
linkage with a wider range of stakeholders than is offered by current crisis
communication theory and best practice.
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